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Abstract. Monkeypox is an acute viral infection with a clinical course resembling smallpox. It is endemic in northern
and central Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but it is reported only sporadically in neighboring Republic of the
Congo (ROC). In October 2009, interethnic violence in northwestern DRC precipitated the movement of refugees across
the Ubangi River into ROC. The influx of refugees into ROC heightened concerns about monkeypox in the area,
because of the possibility that the virus could be imported, or that incidence could increase caused by food insecurity
and over reliance on bush meat. As part of a broad-based campaign to improve health standards in refugee settlement
areas, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) sponsored a program of intensive com-
munity education that included modules on monkeypox recognition and prevention. In the 6 months immediately following
theoutreach, 10 suspected cases ofmonkeypoxwere reported tohealth authorities. Laboratory testing confirmedmonkeypox
virus infection in two individuals, one of whom was part of a cluster of four suspected cases identified retrospectively.
Anecdotes collected at the time of case reporting suggest that the outreach campaign contributed to detection of suspected
cases of monkeypox.
BRIEF REPORT
Monkeypox is an acute viral infection with a clinical course
resembling smallpox. However, unlike smallpox (now eradi-
cated), which only affected humans, monkeypox is a zoonosis
endemic in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The initial symptoms
of monkeypox in humans involve a brief (2–3 days) febrile
prodrome, which is followed by the development of a dissemi-
nated rash that consists of monomorphic, well circumscribed,
deep-seated, and frequently umbilicated, pustular lesions. The
density of lesions is generally highest on the face and extrem-
ities. Lesions can also occur on the palms of the hands and
soles of the feet. During the pustular phase, the visual fea-
tures of monkeypox rash lesions are highly characteristic of
an Orthopoxvirus-associated infection. However, during the
early stages of rash evolution (i.e., papular, vesicular stages)
and after the characteristic peak, when primary lesions have
begun to heal and regress (i.e., crusting, desquamation), it
can be difficult to discriminate between monkeypox and other
rash illnesses based on physical characteristics alone. Labora-
tory testing is thus pivotal to establishing a definitive diagnosis
of monkeypox.
Though the primary sylvatic reservoir of monkeypox remains
unknown, monkeypox is enzootic in northern and central
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).1–3 Monkey-
pox also occurs sporadically in neighboring Republic of the
Congo (ROC), where despite the occurrence of an outbreak
of monkeypox in northern ROC in 2003,4 residents retained
little appreciation of monkeypox and the risks associated
with illness, even in those areas that had been affected by
the disease. This prompted a large-scale community educa-
tion campaign in May–October 2009 in the affected area of
northern ROC. The outreach was performed by Congolese
education and health specialists, using locally produced, local
language materials that feature commentary from prominent
communitymembers.The intent of theoutreachwas toestablish
the foundations for community-based surveillance for monkey-
pox (and other rash illnesses) and to promote health are seeking
behaviors. Outreach activities were performed in 16 commu-
nities stretched out along the Ubangui River bordering DRC;
the content of the training modules has been described else-
where5; among those who attended the film-based outreach
sessions, there was a demonstrated improvement in individuals’
knowledge of the features of monkeypox illness and trans-
mission. And when asked after seeing the films, attendees
expressed a heightened likelihood to notify local officials and
seek health care in the event that monkeypox is suspected in a
familymember.5
As the outreach program was drawing to a close in October
2009, an eruption of interethnic violence in northwestern
DRC precipitated the movement of thousands of refugees
across the Ubangi River into the areas of ROC where the
outreach had just been performed. By the end of January
2010, ~114,000 refugees had relocated to cities and villages
along the river in ROC, concentrating mainly in areas north
of the city of Impfondo (the location of the 2003 outbreak of
monkeypox). The influx of refugees to ROC heightened con-
cerns about monkeypox in the area, because of the possibility
that the virus could be imported, or that food insecurity and
over-reliance on bush meat could lead to increased disease
incidence. In response to this crisis, in April and May, 2010,
as part of a broad-based campaign to improve health standards
in refugee settlement areas, the United Nations International
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) sponsored a program
of intensive community education that included modules on
monkeypox recognition andprevention.The InternationalCon-
servation and Education Fund (INCEF), the implementation
partner for the program, performed an outreach in 25 cities and
villages where the refugees had congregated. Approximately
65,000 people attended the outreach sessions.
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In the 9 months including and immediately following the
outreach, 10 suspected cases of monkeypox were reported to
health authorities (Table 1). (None had been reported during
the prior 12 months.) Skin lesion specimens were collected
from seven of the suspected cases; laboratory testing by quan-
titative polymerase chain reaction assays (described else-
where7–9) was completed for four cases. (Specimens from
the remaining cases were not analyzed because of the dif-
ficulty in obtaining timely transportation to a reference labora-
tory.) Laboratory testing performed at the Institut National
de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa and the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta
confirmed monkeypox virus infection in two individuals (cases
#2, #3)—one of whom (case #3) was the index case in a cluster of
four related suspect monkeypox cases. Two individuals (cases
#1, #5) were ruled out for monkeypox. Further laboratory test-
ing resulted in a diagnosis of yaws for one of these individuals,
as described in a previous publication.6
The first of the confirmed cases (case #2) was 7 years old at
the time of her illness, and may have been displaced by the
conflict, as her home of origin was noted to be in DRC. The
probable source of infection for this patient was not identi-
fied. The second confirmed case (case #3) was a 16- year-old
female of pygmy ethnicity who was a resident of ROC. She
noted the beginnings of a rash on September 1, 2010, after a
short period of fever and dyspnea. By September 14th she had
a disseminated pustular rash, cough, adenopathy, chills, head-
ache, and fatigue. Upon receiving advice from a neighbor who
had attended a monkeypox education session, the family of
case #3 brought her to a clinic run by Medecins d’Afrique,
where she was placed in isolation and lesion specimens and
photos were collected (Figure 1). The uncle of the 16-year-old
girl and his two sons were reported to have had similar illnesses
during the previousmonth; the uncle died and the two boys had
recovered by the time the girl fell ill.
A virus isolate recovered from case #3 was sequenced using
Illumina sequencing technology (Illumina Inc., CA). Genetic
analysis encompassing a 81,137 nucleotide section of the
genome, which spans the region between the E9L and A24R
loci (and includes both; reference strainVACV_Copenhagen),
indicates that the 2010 isolate is highly similar (~99.5%) to
thevirus implicated in a hospital-associated outbreak of
Table 1
Characteristics of suspected cases of monkeypox reported to health authorities in Likouala region, 2010
Case number Date of illness onset Village/town
Clinical criteria
for MPX* Sex Age Description Diagnosis





2 25 May 2010† Boyele Port‡ Insufficient
information
F 7 yr Originally from Kombe,
DRC
+MPX
3 1 September 2010 Ebobo‡ Yes F 16 yr 3 family members
with similar symptoms,
one death during illness;
Pygmy ethnicity noted
+MPX
4 19 September 2010 Boyele Center Insufficient
information
F 8 yr – Undetermined§
5 18 October 2010 Mbanza-
Mokpetene
Yes M 10 yr Pygmy ethnicity noted +Non-venereal Treponema
pallidum subsp. pertenue6
6 20 November 2010 Maybelou Yes F 9 yr Severely underweight Undetermined§
7 21 November 2010 Maybelou Yes M 12 yr Severely underweight Undetermined§
*Clinical criteria consistent with surveillance case definition for suspected monkeypox: vesicular pustular eruption characterized by hard and deep pustules not explained by any other disease,
and a febrile prodrome, or lymphadenopathy (auxillary, auricular, cervical), or lesions on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet.
†Rash onset (unless otherwise noted, date denotes onset of fever or first symptom).
‡Approximate latitude/longitude coordinates Boyele Port 2.547987/18.176879, and Ebobo 3.167940/18.484497.
§Laboratory testing not performed because of lack of availability of specimen transport.
Figure 1. (A) Face showing buccal lesions, (B) hands of case #3. Photos were taken 14 days after illness onset.
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monkeypox that occurred in Impfondo, ROC in 2003.4 It is
less similar to strains isolated in the DRC in 1979 and
1996.1,11 Phylogenetic analysis of this portion of the genome
supports a close relationship between the two isolates col-
lected inROC in 2003 and 201011 (Figure 2).Within the coding
region examined (E9L-A24R), there is only one nucleotide
difference between the two isolates that is predicted to result
in an amino acid change. (A single nucleotide transversion
resulted in the alteration of a methionine to an isoleucine at
amino acid position 56 in the small capping enzyme
[VACV_Copenhagen D12L]). This region includes the cen-
tral area of the genome where many of the genes are con-
served in all poxviruses.
The genetic characteristics of a virus isolate can provide
insights into its geographic origins.12 Any occurrence of human
monkeypox in ROC prompts consideration of whether the
infection was acquired from an indigenous sylvatic source (i.e.,
resident virus with local circulation), or whether the virus could
have been imported from DRC by people, animals, or animal
products. The evidence associated with the two confirmed
cases of monkeypox in ROC from 2010 (cases #2, #3) is for
the most part insufficient to suggest one possibility versus the
other. Detailed exposure histories were unavailable for either
case, and though the high degree of genetic identity observed
between the virus isolated from case #3 and that responsible for
the outbreak in ROC in 2003 could be interpreted as evidence
of an ROC-associated genotype, the paucity of strains available
for comparison from nearby areas in DRC renders it impossi-
ble to determine whether the ROC strains in fact comprise a
unique lineage. Collection of additional isolates on both sides
of the river will be needed to determine the probability that the
ROC strains are sufficiently divergent from those observed
across to Ubangui River to suggest independence.
Anecdotal information collected at the time of case
reporting indicates that the outreach campaign stimulated
community-based surveillance thus contributing to the detec-
tion of suspected cases in refugee settlement areas. Monkey-
pox can spread from person to person and sizable outbreaks
have been documented1; the ability to rapidly detect cases
and implement appropriate interventions to prevent transmis-
sion is particularly important when dealing with densely
aggregated populations that have inadequate health care
resources, such as refugees and internally displaced peoples.
During the 2010 refugee crisis in ROC, seven suspected cases
of monkeypox were identified and reported by health author-
ities. Logistical impediments prevented timely laboratory anal-
ysis of clinical specimens (for two patients specimens were
never tested), but even with this constraint, steps were taken
Figure 2. Maximum clade credibility tree. Whole genomes available at the Poxvirus Bioinformatics Resource Center website (www.poxvirus.org)
were aligned using the MAFFT plugin for Geneious Pro 5.6.410 (Available from http://www.geneious.com; Geneious v5.6). A central region of the
genome stretching from E9L to A24R (VACV Cop) was extracted from the alignment for phylogenetic analysis. The tree search was carried out in
Geneious Pro 5.6.4 using theMrBayes plugin (settings included a GTRmodel with a proportion of invariable sites and a gamma-shaped distribution of
rates across sites, 5M generations, and a 20% burn-in). The final average standard deviation of split frequencies was 0.000306, showing sufficient
convergence of the two runs. Posterior probabilities are labeled at eachnode.Branch lengths are drawn to scale. (GenBankaccession nos.: SUD2005_01
KC257459; DRC_Yandongi KC257460; ROC_2010KC257461.)
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to limit adverse public health consequences of the suspected
monkeypox virus infections. Patients who are rapidly placed in
isolation and provided with supportive care (including treat-
ment for other etiologies on the differential such as yaws)
are more likely to have positive outcomes and less likely to
generate additional cases, regardless of the ultimate labora-
tory diagnosis rendered. Intensive community education can
lead to increased capacity for detection of rare but impactful
diseases such as monkeypox in high transmission risk settings.
Education of physicians in the recognition and treatment of
monkeypox is a critically important adjunct to this activity.
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